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Abstract 
 
The end of the communist regimes in Europe was regarded initially as a challenge to social 
sciences. The transformations towards democracy and market economy on which these 
countries embarked after 1990 spanned the economic and the political spheres. They also 
involved a swift reinsertion in the world economy. Thus, the need for integrative approaches 
that could give an account of systemic change is obvious. However, most scholarship on post-
communist transformations has maintained the traditional division of labour between 
different social science disciplines.  
 
This paper explores the possibility of articulating such an integrative approach to systemic 
change by reviewing current theories in Economics, Politics and International Political 
Economy. In each of these disciplines, neo-liberal, neo-institutionalist, and reflexive theories 
are investigated in order to establish their potential for integration in a political economy 
approach of transformations that could also be useful in understanding the relationships 
between the domestic and the international spheres.  Finally, it is suggested that while within 
all of these groups, theories from the different disciplines use similar analytical 
presuppositions and explanatory strategies, it is only the reflexive theories that say enough 
about the relationships between the different spheres, as relationships of relative autonomy 
from each other, to enable the articulation of a few working hypotheses about how these 
relationships might be studied. At the same time, it is recognised that in so far as the 
economic, political, domestic and international spheres are considered under the aspects that 
account for their autonomy from each other, neo-institutional approaches could also be 
usefully employed.  
 
 
Key words: Economics, Politics, International Political Economy, Neo-liberalism, Neo-
institutionalism, Reflexive theories  
 
Address for correspondence  
Dr Liliana Pop 
Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation 
University of Warwick 
Coventry CV4 7AL 
Tel: 024 7652 8907 
Fax: 024 7657 2548 
E-mail: L.Pop@warwick.ac.uk 
Liliana_Pop44@hotmail.com
3Many have seen the end of the communist regimes in Europe as a challenge to social 
sciences. Most immediately, their failure to anticipate it led to questions about the credibility 
of, at least, communist studies. Second, the simultaneity of economic, social, and political 
changes that followed invited a return to integrative, political economy, approaches to 
systemic change.   
 
However obvious such considerations, the end of the Cold War has not led to profound 
reassessments of the separation between economics and politics: most scholarly analyses of 
post-communist transformations in Eastern Europe tend to deal with economic and political 
phenomena separately. For instance, the literature on democratisation (Crăiuţu 1996; Linz 
and Stepan 1996) and nationalism and political culture (Verdery 1991; 1996; Gallagher 
1995; Tismăneanu 1998) ignores economic factors. Similarly, studies of the economy 
(OECD 1993; 1998; Şerbănescu 1994; Vosganian 1994a; IMF 1996; 1997; 2000; 2001; 
Dăianu 1996b; EBRD 1999; 2000) lack an understanding of the politics of economic reform. 
On occasion, indicators of political change are used as independent variables for the 
explanation of economic success or failure (Hellman 1996; Fish 1998; Hellman, Jones and 
Kaufmann 2000), but statistical processing of data rather than theoretical explanations seem 
to provide the connections between these sets of phenomena.  
 
This paper investigates the literatures on economic and political post-communist 
transformations in Eastern Europe in order to establish to what extent they might be useful in 
articulating an approach to systemic transformations that could potentially overcome this 
separation of the political and the economic, both within the domestic and the international 
spheres. In order to do this, the paper looks at theories in Economics, Politics and 
International Political Economy (IPE) and asks to what extent, if rigorously combined, they 
might lead to the formulation of some working presuppositions about the relationship 
between these spheres, economic and political, domestic and international.  
 
The starting point of this paper is that in each of the three disciplines, Economics, Politics 
and International Political Economy (IPE) there could be found three broad groups of 
theories:  neo-liberal, neo-institutionalist and reflexive (see Figure 1 below). This is certainly 
the case in the literatures about post-communist transformations, and it is possible that, upon 
further enquiry, this organisation might be extended to the whole of their respective fields. 
4Theories in the different groups, across the different disciplines, are deemed to have in 
common certain analytical presuppositions.   
 
The assumptions of the neo-liberal theories are the most parsimonious. The actions of 
rational, self-seeking individuals are deemed to generate spontaneously a co-ordinating 
mechanism – such as the market, democratic pluralism or the balance of power – provided 
that certain rules and rights are in place. Neo-institutionalist theories use this general 
framework as well, but they go further by looking at how institutions intervene to bridge the 
individual and macro-social levels of analysis and to introduce dynamics of their own. 
Reflexive approaches recognise the previous theories as valid instruments for understanding 
some aspects of social action, and as theories that, in having become established, respond to 
and are used as legitimate instruments for furthering particular interests. In addition, 
reflexive theories deal directly with the traditional dichotomies of science, the dyads of 
agency and structure, material and ideal, objective and subjective. Reflexive theories seek 
not to privilege one term over the other, but to explain how they are at work concomitantly. 
The embeddedness of individual and institutional phenomena in social, cultural and 
historical contexts is a core concern. Competing accounts of social reality, including 
scholarly texts, are seen as instruments for political action. 
 
The economic, political and IPE theories share the complexity criterion of their group with 
some variation. For instance, democracy studies are predominantly neo-liberal, but they also 
include some concerns with institutions. However, this author considers that democracy 
studies share the neo-liberal assumption that a certain ‘automatic’ mechanism – democratic 
pluralism – alone ensures desirable results. This justifies the discussion of democracy studies 
under the heading of neo-liberal theories. Similarly, at the other end of the spectrum, 
economic sociology tends to be embraced by social scientists that may or may not have a 
straight economics background. To an extent, economic sociology strays outside the domain 
of contemporary economics. 
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6Thus, this paper shows to what extent neo-liberal, neo-institutionalist and reflexive theories 
could contribute to the formulation of some working hypotheses about the relationship 
between the economy and politics, and the domestic and international spheres, that might, in 
turn, shape the study of post-communist, systemic, transformations. 
 
1. Neo-liberal theories   
 
The end of communism in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) was seen in the early 1990s as 
a victory for liberalism (Fukuyama 1992), and liberal theories played a crucial role in 
shaping the understanding of developments in these countries as transitions to democracy 
and market economy. This section reviews neo-classical economics, democracy studies and 
neo-realism as variants of neo-liberalism, and it evaluates their potential for integration in a 
political economy approach that spans the domestic and international spheres. Neo-liberal 
theories have in common a conception of actors as autonomous, rational and self-interested. 
The aggregate effect of actions by such actors, in conditions of nearly perfect information 
and competition, is efficient markets and democracies, presumably those approximated by 
Western Europe.   
 
Neo-classical economics  
Neo-classical economics inspired the ‘shock therapy’ strategy of reform, tried in a number of 
CEE countries, especially Poland, Russia, Estonia and, from 1997, Romania. Believing that 
actors adapt rationally to the incentives of their economic environment, neo-classical 
economists advocated the swift change of these environmental conditions, through the 
introduction of macro-stabilisation, liberalisation of trade and prices, convertibility of the 
currency, and privatisation (Blanchard et al. 1991; Blanchard et al. 1993). The expectation 
was that enterprises would adjust to competition, spontaneous entrepreneurial initiatives 
would spring up to take advantage of new opportunities, and markets would form. The hold 
of the bureaucracy on the economy would be removed at one stroke, and, it was hoped, these 
measures would become irreversible before those fearful of their consequences could 
organise an effective opposition (Sachs 1993, 44-66). Temporary side effects such as 
unemployment, deterioration of real incomes, and economic recession - although undesirable 
– would be the lesser evil compared to the shortages of the previous era and the threat of 
inflation (Sachs 1993, 67-72).  
7In principle, freeing up the planned economy should eliminate its distortions and lead to 
increased production. Early projections of growth in the region were optimistic (Kolodko 
1993). However, all countries in transition traversed a prolonged period of recession and 
even depression, which was counterintuitive from the point of view of this theory. Later 
studies recognised that the economic decline was due to the lack of effective markets, which 
did not materialise as expected. Also, high unemployment did not attenuate when growth 
resumed (Blanchard 1997, 25-54). These and other puzzling effects led Blanchard (1997, 26) 
to admit that 'we are some way from understanding the effects of macroeconomic policies in 
the context of transition economies'.  
 
Such admissions can be found occasionally in academic texts, but doubts disappear when the 
theory is taken as the basis for action, when it becomes an ideology. Because they require 
swift and comprehensive changes, shock therapy programmes can be associated with 
illiberal and anti-democratic strategies of implementation (Przeworski 1993). Some went as 
far as to advocate that the answer to economic problems is to give free reign to committed 
reformers, technocrats who combine political skill with insight in economic matters and 
creativity in designing the appropriate institutions for the situations at hand (Sachs 1993; 
Williamson 1994).  
 
Democracy studies   
In the political field, liberal theories dominated the debates over democratisation in Eastern 
Europe at the beginning of the 1990s (Di Palma 1990; 1991; Linz and Stepan 1996).1 
Democracy studies share with neo-classical economics core assumptions about individuals 
as rational, self-seeking agents, endowed with certain freedoms, including the freedom to 
associate and mobilise politically for the promotion of their interests. It is also implied that 
just as the market arbitrates economic competition, the state is a neutral arbiter of political 
interests (Dahl 1996). Under conditions of democratic pluralism, then, democracy is  ‘a 
competitive political market’ whose minimal framework consists of ‘rules to keep the 
market competitive’ (Di Palma 1990, 41-2).  
 
1 This was a continuation of studies of transitions from authoritarian rule in Latin America and Southeast Europe 
(O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead 1986). There was some discussion about the appropriateness of comparing 
democratisation in these two regions with post-communist CEE. See Bunce (1995) for a review of the debate.  
8Liberals also define democracy as a matter of behaviour and attitude for politicians and the 
public. A political regime is democratic when all political actors engage according to certain 
rules - free electoral competition between a diversity of political parties - without looking to 
change these rules, and when the majority of the public believes that democracy is the 
desirable political regime. The agreement between the main political parties on the rules of 
the game is expressed in an explicit or implicit pact (Stepan 1986, 79). Democracy becomes 
established when all actors accept that conflict is resolved through legal procedures and 
institutions (Linz and Stepan 1996, 6). Consolidated democracies are characterised by a 
relatively high level of development of the civil, political and economic society, the rule of 
law, and the state apparatus (Linz and Stepan 1996, 7-15).2  
 
Given that democracy studies focus on assessing whether a country has achieved democracy, 
their utility, after countries reach this point, is in question. More than a decade since the fall 
of communism, most CEE countries meet the criteria for liberal democratisation and 
democratic consolidation. This is attested, for instance, by the evaluations of the European 
Commission in regards to the 10 CEE countries which are negotiating accession to the 
European Union (EC 2000).3 Concerns remain about the depth of the process, as well as the 
ability of the civil society to hold the government to account and withstand nationalistic 
pressures. However, the insights offered by democracy studies remain useful for the 
understanding of the transition to democratic regimes in CEE and the difficulties of the first 
few years. 
 
Neo-realist International Political Economy  
It is difficult to find within the IPE literature a school that mirrors exactly the neo-liberal 
assumptions about behaviour and motivation. However, a partial overlap can be identified in 
the neo-realist tradition. Waltz (1979; 1995) took neo-liberal economics as an example of 
how theory can be built by judicious choice of parsimonious assumptions. Waltz also made 
explicit parallels between microeconomic theory and his theory of international politics. 
Thus, ‘international political systems, like economic markets, are formed by the co-action of 
the self-regarding units,’ i.e. states, and they are ‘individualist in origin, spontaneously 
The assumption that the democratic model can ever be achieved fully was evaluated by O'Donnell (1996a, 1996b), 
and Gunther, Dimandouros and Puhle (1996).
9generated, and unintended’  (Waltz 1979, 91). Anarchy, the lack of an overarching system-
wide authority, predisposes states to seek power and security by engaging in competitive and 
conflictual behaviour. This environment sanctions any maladjustment between purpose and 
abilities. Consequently, international institutions play only a marginal role in facilitating co-
operation (Grieco 1995, 153).  
 
In order to demonstrate that international politics is a distinct field of enquiry, Waltz (1979, 
39-40) argued that knowing the characteristics, purposes or interactions of the units that 
comprise this system is not sufficient for explaining outcomes and events at the system-
level. And because the units of the international system are considered functionally identical, 
the nexus between the domestic and the international is largely outside the focus of this 
theory, although a broad gesture towards the recognition of a need to explore this link has 
been made (Baldwin 1993, 23-4).4 
 
Significantly, the most important realist contribution to IPE could not follow this framework 
rigidly. It is, instead, rather eclectic (Gilpin 1987). Gilpin's International Political Economy 
(1987, 19-30) accepts the market as the means for resource allocation and the motor of 
growth, but it also recognises the limitations of liberal economics, its asocial character. 
Moreover, historically the expansion of markets was underwritten by states. In the post-war 
era, it was the assumption by USA of the role of hegemonic power that led both to political 
stability and economic growth. The structural tensions of the international political economy 
are generated by the uneven development of different countries and sectors across time, and 
they could be amplified by the decline of the hegemon (Gilpin 1987, 65-117).  
 
The neo-liberal political economy: An assessment   
A synthesis between neo-liberal Economics, Politics and IPE would begin by recognising 
their homology. In Economics and Politics the homology is nearly perfect: individual 
economic and political freedoms are affirmed and the same rules of the game - competition, 
property rights, equality of opportunity – prevail. In IPE, the basic units, the states, are 
3 These countires are Bulgaria, The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia and Slovenia.  
4 This is not to deny that traditional realists, such as Carr (1940), Morgenthau (1985) and List (1991), were more 
interested in domestic politics than their neo-realist successors.  
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functionally identical, a spontaneous structure emerges, but there is more acknowledgement 
of the hierarchical nature of this structure, power and inequality.  
 
However, beyond this observation about the homologous structure of their assumptions and 
arguments, it would be difficult to use neo-liberal theories to derive statements about the 
relationships between the economic and political spheres, the domestic and the international. 
Some liberals have argued that individual economic and political freedoms enhance each 
other and that there is a necessary relationship between capitalism and democracy (Hayek 
1944; Friedman 1962). Although the affinity between capitalism and democracy cannot be 
denied, many examples exist of authoritarian regimes that have successful capitalist 
economies; Franco’s Spain and contemporary Singapore are only the most obvious. This fact 
points to the inability of liberal theories to base the connection between capitalism and 
democracy in a conception of the relationship between the political and economy spheres.  
 
This difficulty in explaining the link between the economy and politics is connected to the 
contradictory position on power at the core of liberalism. Liberal capitalism in Western 
Europe was promoted on ethical grounds. The claim that liberalism reflected needs and 
rights fundamental to human nature was crucial to this project; Smith’s (1997, 117) phrase, 
that there is a ‘certain propensity in human nature’ ‘to truck, barter and exchange one thing 
for another’ is a famous example. This strategy obscured the fact that liberal capitalism was 
aided and abetted by state political intervention and that it satisfied certain interest groups at 
the expense of others (Polanyi 1957).  
 
More generally, the strong normative emphasis in liberal thought leads to the possibility of 
confusing the desirability of a society characterised by equality of opportunity and universal 
rights with the analysis of existing societies. The liberal model of the ideal economy and 
polity can thus serve to reinforce the privileges of the few for whom liberal rights are already 
a reality and to maintain the exclusion of the dispossessed (Mouffe 1993; Bauman 1995).  
 
The separation between the economic and the political spheres is consistent with this thrust 
within liberal theories towards the normative and the apolitical. The reality of this separation 
is revealed by the fact that proponents of economic liberal programmes turn to voluntarism – 
an anti-democratic and supposedly illiberal procedure. Their liberalism does not constrain 
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them and at the same time it seems not to give them any other acceptable alternative for 
meeting their objectives.  
 
For the purposes of this argument, neo-liberal political economy does not offer a sufficiently 
credible set of assumptions about the relationship between the economy and politics, the 
domestic and the international spheres. It emphasises the desired end result of post-
communist transformations but it lacks an understanding of their historical starting point and 
the ways of bridging the two. At the same time, understanding the liberal arguments is 
important in order to appreciate the point of view of some of the actors involved in the post-
communist transformations in CEE: the IFIs, the IMF and the World Bank in particular. The 
integration in the analysis of actors and their respective world-views and structural positions 
will be discussed at greater length in section 3.  
 
2. Neo-institutionalist theories 
 
The main difference between neo-institutionalist and neo-liberal theories is the modification 
of the initial assumptions about human behaviour and individual or state motivation. 
Aggregate social outcomes do not arise spontaneously from interaction between rational and 
perfectly informed individuals in pursuit of self-interest. Neo-institutionalists believe that 
actors operate in an environment already structured by institutions. These facilitate collective 
action, reduce the costs of enforcing rules, create order, facilitate exchanges and the 
management of conflicts.  
 
Evolutionary economics  
As evolutionary economists pointed out, in spite of its relative dominance as a guide to 
policy in the 1980s and 1990s, neo-classical economics has a limited role in explaining 
economic outcomes. It is restricted to the analysis of a few markets where conditions are 
close to those used by the model (North 1990; Coase 1993). Neo-liberal economics cannot 
explain, for instance, the performance of the planned and post-communist economies 
(Murrell 1991; Olson 1992).  
 
To overcome this limitation, North (1990) argued that the basic assumptions of neo-classical 
economics have to be modified. Participants in economic and political transactions do not 
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have full information, and the costs of assessing for themselves the value of all the 
dimensions of what is exchanged would be beyond their means. Thus, rules of the game, 
institutions, such as secure property rights, legislation, the independence of the judiciary and 
others, are needed to structure, enforce and reduce the uncertainty of agreements (North 
1990, 17-35). Institutions are the main variables that explain why certain countries are rich 
while others remain poor (Olson 1996).  
 
Institutions create stability within firms and economies, but economic success also depends 
on innovation. This dynamism is given by organisations that negotiate their interests within 
the accepted rules of the game (North 1990). The population of organisations as a whole is 
also continuously tested within capitalism by what are still seen as automatic mechanisms 
(Murrell 1992). These are the market allocation of resources from inefficient to efficient 
organisations, the removal of inefficient organisations through bankruptcy, take-overs and 
mergers, and the entry into the market of new organisations (Murrell 1992, 39).  
 
Evolutionary economics produced an alternative strategy for reform in post-communist CEE: 
gradualism. In gradualism, the creation of institutional conditions for market activity takes 
precedence over liberalisation and privatisation (Olson 1992, 65). The new private sector, 
rather than privatisation, is seen as the motor for growth (Clague 1992). Direct state control 
over certain enterprises should be maintained in order to enforce hard budget constraints and 
to restructure (Carlin and Mayer 1994); the swift change in the economic environment 
proposed by neo-liberals might not determine enterprises to change their attitudes and 
behaviour (Murrell 1992: 46-7). Institutional change takes time, and it involves a great deal 
of experimentation and uncertainty. Additionally, the functioning of formal institutions is 
underpinned by informal institutions embedded in broader social norms (North 1990, 37-46). 
Without informal pro-market institutions, the legal framework for reform, however well 
designed, would be too costly to operate (Rapaczynski 1996, 88; Berg 1994, 167). Against a 
background of unsettling and uncertain change, old institutions might still perform a useful 
temporary function in maintaining a semblance of macroeconomic stability (Murrell 1992: 
49-51).  
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Neo-institutionalist politics   
Evolutionary economics has a counterpart in the neo-institutionalist study of politics. Within 
this research agenda, the definition of democracy is broadly that of democracy studies, but 
the focus of research is on how democratic values become institutions, i.e. rules of the game 
with a certain organisational embodiment and power to structure political actions and events.  
 
According to neo-institutionalists, the main characteristic of post-communist political 
transformations in Eastern Europe is the simultaneity of changes in stateness, in the new 
constitutional order and political regime, and the fluctuations of day-to-day politics (Offe 
1991; 1996; Elster, Offe and Preuss 1998). Neo-institutionalist studies of politics also sought 
to discern the causal connections between institutional design, a certain distribution of power 
or assets between relevant actors and the success or failure of democratisation and economic 
reform (Elster 1996; Hellman 1996).  
 
The fall of the communist regimes was attributed to contingent factors. It did not involve the 
military, foreign intervention or a revolutionary group. Lacking these sources of 
legitimation, the emerging political actors in the post-communist countries were structurally 
weak (Elster, Offe and Preuss 1998). This weakness on the agency side interacted with a 
complex agenda for change to create a situation of diffuse power and little central authority 
(Elster, Offe and Preuss 1998, 17-21).  
 
In spite of unpromising odds, the study of political events in post-communist countries in the 
1990s revealed that a degree of leadership was provided, political parties and party systems 
emerged, constitutions were adopted, and radical economic reform took place. This 
incongruity between what could be expected according to theory and the reality on the 
ground was an argument for a stronger inductive element in the neo-institutionalist research 
strategy (Elster, Offe and Preuss 1998), while neo-institutionalist theory proposed the 
development of institutions as the benchmark for assessing post-communist transformations.  
 
Similar to the position of democracy studies, the new political regimes are considered 
consolidated when the rules of the game are no longer renegotiated, and rules begin to be 
taken for granted. In addition, neo-institutionalists explain that consolidation is achieved 
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when agents are able to abide by rules created at higher levels of authority and have 
internalised the rules by practising self-supervision.  
 
Consolidation of the new regime is also reflected in the differentiation between the 
institutional spheres. In the broadest terms, this could mean the separation between economy 
and politics. In any case, when institutions have become differentiated, there is limited 
convertibility of resources and status from one to the other (Elster, Offe and Preuss 1998, 29-
31). The expectation remained that weak political actors would tend to employ strategies of 
direct control, rather than delegation, sharing, and self-binding. This inability to empower 
institutions and create autonomous spheres for their activities would have as an associated 
symptom a ‘pathology’ of ‘decree-ism’ and constant tinkering with regulations (Elster, Offe 
and Preuss 1998, 31-4).   
 
Neo-institutionalism in IPE   
Neo-institutionalism in IPE recognises some of the descriptions of international relations 
proposed by neo-realists, and it shares their rational choice methodology (Botcheva and 
Martin 2001). In addition, it takes the view that institutions, values and ideas should be taken 
seriously as counterbalance to the realist power politics of domination and inequality 
(Keohane 1986).  As such, neo-institutionalist IPE subsumes realism (Keohane 1989, 15-6).   
 
Keohane's definition of institutions is similar to that of North. Thus, institutions are 
"persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioural 
roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations" (Keohane 1989, 3). Keohane does not make 
however a clear distinction between institutions and organisations. Carriers and enforcers of 
rules, such as formal intergovernmental or cross-national non-governmental organisations, 
are listed as institutions, together with more diffuse forms of institutionalisation 
(international regimes and conventions, i.e. spontaneous orders that operate mainly 
informally) (Keohane 1989, 3-4).5 Ideas are also important factors in explaining policy 
outcomes. They ‘influence policy when the principled or causal beliefs they embody provide 
5 The analysis of one of these types of institutions, regimes, has a literature of its own that includes both advocates 
(Krasner 1982a; 1982b; Young 1992; 1999) and critics (Strange 1982; 1987; Grunberg 1990; Underhill 2000). 
More recently, neo-institutionalist IPE has specified criteria for the assessment of the legalisation, the ‘hardness’ and 
‘softness’ of institutions (Abbott et al. 2000; Goldstein and Martin 2000). Halpern (1993) studied the role of ideas 
and institutions in spreading a certain model of political economy to the countries of the former Soviet block. 
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road maps that increase actors’ clarity about goals and ends-means relationships, when they 
affect outcomes of strategic situations in which there is no unique equilibrium and when they 
become embedded in political institutions’ (Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 3). 
 
Analytically, the study of institutions and ideas does not require a separation between the 
domestic and international spheres: policy can be seen as ‘the result of calculated choices 
made by political and economic actors' (Goldstein and Martin 2000: 603) irrespective of this 
divide. Consequently, neo-institutionalist IPE developed a number of ways of thinking about 
the relationship between the domestic and international spheres. For instance, Moravcsik 
(1998) saw states as rational actors who seek to use the opportunities of international co-
operation for the economic benefit of their domestic constituencies.  
 
Frieden and Rogowski (1996) suggested that changes in relative world prices impact on the 
value of the assets of domestic groups. This leads domestic groups to reassess their policy 
preferences and to mobilise politically for changes in policy. In addition, Garrett and Lange 
(1996, 49) argued that domestic political institutions mediate the relationship between 
changes in preferences and domestic policy outcomes. Assuming that governments aim to 
retain power, to maintain the distributional advantages of their supporters and to expand the 
wealth of the nation, there are two types of intervening, institutional, variables that mediate 
the causal link between changes in world prices and domestic policy outcomes (Garrett and 
Lange 1996: 50-56). These are the organisation of socio-economic interests, i.e. labour 
market institutions, and formal political institutions, including regime type and the players' 
veto power.  
 
Governments have to do a complex balancing act. Continuing to support the distributional 
interests of their core constituencies might come at the cost of worsening macroeconomic 
performance. In this case, in order to improve macroeconomic results, institutional change 
would be necessary. But such change is likely to occur only if the costs in terms of loss of 
support accepted, if the conjuncture is right, and if the governments have a reasonable 
amount of time before they face the voters again (Garrett and Lange 1996: 54). Strong 
institutionalisation of certain industrial interests and the depth of reform required in the post-
communist countries are expected to accentuate these difficulties (Evangelista 1996).  
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Neo-institutionalist political economy: An assessment 
It has become apparent that the relationship between the neo-institutionalist theories in 
Economics, Politics and IPE is one of homology. Their units of analysis and the main causal 
mechanisms are the same. It is also possible to discern the potential for a substantial 
integration of statements about the economy and politics, the domestic and international 
spheres. Economic, market institutions depend on political arrangements, such as a strong 
judiciary. Also, self-confident exercise of political authority is necessary for the delegation 
of power and autonomy to economic institutions, while the state remains a sort of authority 
of last resort and guarantor of these institutions. The division between the domestic and the 
international spheres is more muted: institutions from both realms interact and shape 
outcomes.  
 
However, neo-institutionalist theories stop short of explaining how the relationship between 
the economic and political spheres might be conceived. Their main strength is that they 
provide a useful way of understanding economic and political phenomena in their autonomy 
from each other, in so far as the institutions specific to the economic and political spheres 
have become resilient and self-contained. In other words, the institutions that comprise one 
sphere cannot be easily overturned by intervention from the other: politicians do not control 
the economy directly, and economic interests have to use existing political institutions to 
promote their agendas.  
 
CEE countries at the end of the communist regime were still characterised by a high degree 
of fusion between the political and economic spheres (Comisso 1986), and their 
differentiation has been a major element in post-communist transformations (Batt 1994). In 
this context, neo-institutionalist theories explain that differentiation means ensuring the 
autonomy of the institutions specific to the two spheres and offer tools for assessing this 
differentiation. As will be explained later, these neo-institutionalist insights could be put in 
the larger context provided by reflexive theories and the working hypotheses derived from 
them about the relationship between the economic and political forms of power.   
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3. Reflexive theories  
 
The reflexive theories presented in this section recognise the role of institutions in 
explaining economic and political phenomena. In addition, they attempt to elucidate the 
processes and mechanisms through which institutions are or become embedded in social life. 
As shown above, all social theories make assumptions about how individuals operate, what 
determines behaviour, etc. Neo-liberals are interested only in the rational component of 
decision-making and behaviour. Neo-institutionalists take the position that some problems 
cannot be resolved by ratiocination alone but are satisfied by rules of the game or 
institutions. Reflexive theories also need a conception of the person that includes emotions 
as well as reason and participation in accepted social norms. Reflexive theories can also be 
used for deriving some hypotheses about the relationship between the economic and political 
spheres.   
 
Economic sociology 
Contributors to this literature engage with the views on economic life and capitalism 
espoused by neo-liberals and neo-institutionalists. Many of the themes are the same: the 
nature of economic exchanges and comparative economic systems. However, economic 
sociologists criticise the reification of the market by neo-liberals and the inadequate neo-
institutionalist explanations of how economic institutions become embedded and change.  
 
Polanyi (1992) made two important observations that put in perspective the role and 
importance of the market as the prime economic institution. First, he noted that market 
exchange is only one historical form of economic integration. Other examples are 
reciprocity, mutuality, and, it could be argued, the plan. Second, each of these mechanisms 
for economic integration is underpinned by specific social structures. Thus, reciprocity is the 
exchange of goods and favours between symmetrically arranged actors; redistribution takes 
place when a centre can command contributions from subordinated groups to be used for 
common projects.  
 
In the case of the market, its relationship with the society in which it operates is tense and 
contradictory (Polanyi 1957). For Polanyi (1957), capitalism was characterised by a tension, 
a double movement between the reduction of nature, people and money to mere factors of 
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production and the reassertion of broader societal values. Capitalism could not exist if 
markets did not transform people in labour, nature in land, and money and wealth in capital. 
But the continued existence of capitalism also depends on the resistance of society to the 
shaping force of the market. Without this resistance, the market could destroy its own 
sustenance.6 
 
From this perspective, it can be argued that the plan was a mode of economic integration that 
went beyond redistribution: it was based on a pattern of social relations in which the 
autonomy of the economic sphere was severely reduced through its subordination to political 
ideology (Kornai 1992). The plan also intensified the tension between the economic and 
political priorities it served and society. It required that people became not only labour 
subordinated to the state planned economy, but also believers in the communist ideology, 
irrespective of their own inclinations. 
 
Although societies tend to have a dominant economic mechanism of co-ordination, other 
mechanisms can also be present. For instance, modern market economies sustain a sizeable 
redistributive mechanism as illustrated by the Western European welfare states. Mutuality 
also survives within kinship and friendship networks (Barber 1995, 396-400). Similarly, in 
planned economies limited markets existed at the margin of the planned economy (Olson 
1996). 
 
More recently, Granovetter (1985; 1992) put the concept of embeddedness at the core of 
economic sociology. According to him, embeddedness occupies the middle ground between 
the under-socialised conceptions of human action of the economists and the over-socialised 
conceptions of the sociologists. Neo-liberal economists assume that markets are automatic 
mechanisms that integrate dispersed economic agents and activities, while evolutionary 
economics takes for granted the effectiveness of institutions. Sociologists on the other hand 
tend to close prematurely the space for autonomous action by presuming nearly complete 
conditioning of actors (Granovetter 1985, 483-487). In contrast, the notion of embeddedness 
suggests that economic decisions and behaviour occur within concrete networks of relations. 
Economic decisions are rarely based only on price considerations or generalised assumptions 
6 Schumpeter (1943) also believed that capitalism relies on the bedrock of social relations inherited from a previous 
era and that it has a tendency to erode these relations.  
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about the honesty and morality of others. Information accrued within existing relationships is 
considered the most reliable guide to action (Granovetter 1985, 487-493). 7  
 
The works of Stark (1990; 1992), and Stark and Bruszt (1998) on post-communist 
transformations in CEE are consistent with the economic sociology approach. Stark and 
Bruszt (1998) provided evidence for the capacity of economic actors in CEE to recombine 
institutional elements from the past in order to survive and adapt to the uncertainties of post-
communist transformations. They showed that networks of firms, rather than individual 
firms, are the suitable units of analysis for assessing economic policy. The pre-existing 
relationships and dependencies between firms contain crucial resources – in terms of 
information, trust, and patterns of economic advantage – that could be put to use in 
designing restructuring strategies (Stark and Bruszt 1998, 109-36). In their view, when the 
CEE governments designed policies that allowed economic actors to use these resources, the 
economy performed relatively well. When the strategies were aggressively neo-liberal and 
hostile to these networks, economic crisis was usually the consequence (Stark and Bruszt 
1998, 166-187).  
 
Clearly, post-communist economies have embarked on a process of change in which the 
mechanism of economic integration itself is changing and economic sociology offers some 
tools for understanding this important dimension of systemic change. Also, economic 
sociologists warn that given the embeddedness of economic activities and actors in specific 
networks, it should be expected that change will be complicated and protracted. Although 
economic sociologists do not theorise the issue in this way explicitly, the tension they 
explore can be rendered in the terminology of agency and structure. The economy-wide, 
persistent mechanism of economic integration can be seen as a structure: it is the compelling 
relationship between the elements of the economic system. By casting the issue in this way, 
it is possible to appreciate the homology between the different reflexive theories as will be 
shown below.  
 
 
 
7 See also the volume edited by Granovetter and Swedberg (1992). 
20
Symbols and interests in politics  
As seen above, democracy was defined in neo-liberal theories as a political system based on 
pluralism, competition between parties and regular and fair elections. In addition, 
institutionalist approaches look at the arrangements in which these principles become 
expressed. However, neo-institutionalist approaches lack a conceptual apparatus for dealing 
with some aspects of political power and its links with other forms of power, and this is one 
of the major concerns for reflexive theories. In addition, symbolic power and the power 
derived from strong identification with certain ideals, which are of crucial importance for the 
study of polities in transformation, will be addressed here by using the work of Weber 
(1994) and Edelman (1964).  
 
Writing in 1919, Max Weber (1994: 21) thought that an effective claim to govern must be 
backed by economic power as well as political maturity:  
Throughout history it has been the attainment of economic power which has led any given 
class to believe it is a candidate for political leadership. It is dangerous, and in the long-
term incompatible with the interests of the nation, for an economically declining class to 
exercise political rule (Herrschaft). But it is more dangerous still when classes which are 
moving towards economic power, and therefore expect to take over political rule, do no yet 
have the political maturity to assume the direction of the state.  
 
According to Weber, the economy and politics are in a relationship of relative autonomy. 
Their inter-dependence is expressed in the fact that groups and classes can use power 
accrued in one sphere to gain or maintain power in the other. Economic power is considered 
the prerequisite for a bid to obtain political power. Declining economic classes might resist 
relinquishing their dominant political position and use this position to slow down their 
economic decline. Weber also implies here that a state of equilibrium exists when the 
dominant economic class also steers state policy, which assumes that there should be an 
agreement between the values and principles of the economic sphere and those of political 
rule. The co-existence between liberal capitalism and liberal democracy could be an example 
of harmonious alignment between the political and economy spheres.  
 
But while the economic and political spheres are interdependent, they also have a degree of 
independence from each other. The skill of wielding power is an autonomous political 
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factor. This skill is trained through participation in political institutions that encourage and 
reward leadership and the assumption of responsibility (Weber 1994, 145-271). Equally, the 
rise of a new economic class can happen alongside the influence over the economy of the 
incumbent political class.  
 
In the case of the post-communist transformations, the relationship between the economy 
and politics has been changing while each of these spheres has shifted towards different 
values and principles of organisation. From the fusion of the economy and politics based on 
the plan and the leading role of the communist party, the change is towards a more 
autonomous political sphere based on democratic pluralism and a relatively autonomous 
economic sphere based on the market.  
 
Thus, Weber’s hypotheses about the relative autonomy of the economic and the political 
spheres can serve as a useful heuristic device, a background against which the particularities 
of the communist and post-communist regimes can be brought out and understood more 
fully. The centrally planned economies subordinated to the party-state represented a 
historical case that tested to the limit the hypothesis that political power and economic power 
are interdependent. The end of that experiment, a reassertion of the autonomy between these 
two spheres, was not simply the result of a new economic class asserting its own political 
claims.8 
 
For these reasons, the economic and political causes for the fall of the communist regimes 
have been placed in areas where the autonomy of the two spheres, although severely 
restricted, was still preserved. For instance, because the communist regimes were part of a 
wider capitalist system of economic activity and exchange, its performance was, in spite of 
the numerous strategies taken by the regimes to prevent this, subject to outside criteria of 
evaluation. Thus, a certain level of economic decline in the communist countries in the 
8 This point seems to stand at least in so far as the domestic polities are regarded as relatively autonomous of 
international influence. But of course, the argument has been made that the insertion of the communist states in the 
capitalist world economy put pressure on the communist regimes and ultimately their end was also the victory of the 
capitalism. This observation is important because it takes into account the international dimension of change. At the 
same time, it was domestic groups who carried out the regime change and even though the demonstration effect of 
capitalist economic success, by comparison to the economic performance of the communist regimes was clear, it 
would be quite difficult to ascertain the direct involvement of a transnational capitalist class in the end of these 
regimes.
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1980s could be ascertained (Kornai 1992, 168-196) and this might have created an 
opportunity for political change.  
 
Thom (1996), and Elster, Preuss and Offe (1998) found that the causes for the fall of 
communism were non-systemic and contingent. Other explanations also emphasise changes 
in general conditions – such as the spread of the perception that the Western economic and 
political models (Verdery 1996, 19-38) or corruption of the integrity of the Communist party 
from within (Jowitt 1998, 87-91) - rather than strong agency as the determining factor for 
change. Thus, it remains puzzling why in agreeing to the changes in the economic and 
political system, groups that evidently had something to lose, such as the non-skilled labour, 
actually supported it, while others, who were not capitalists took it upon themselves to 
implement market reform (Bauman 1994). 
 
Furthermore, to understand how agents socialised in the communist order could beget a new 
one, it is useful to note a Weberian insight as to why and how classes or some other form of 
group solidarity are necessary for exercising authority in the name of a society or state. Thus, 
groups provide not only a definition of material (economic) interests, but also, a whole 
worldview, solidarity and a sense of common purpose (Weber 1976; Eyal and Townsley 
1995, 727-8). This is necessary because consequential (political) decisions cannot be 
resolved by simple ratiocination, they are backed by the ‘institutional thinking’ already in 
place (Douglas 1987, 4).  
 
The case of post-communist transformations seems to indicate that agents have some choice 
about how they use these ideational elements; and alternative loyalties and solidarity can be 
built around such uses. Eyal, Szélenyi and Townsley (1998) observed that certain groups 
extracted elements of the communist ideology from their political context at the time and 
recast them as a new source of identity and motivation.9 Some technocrats, managers, and 
dissident intelligentsia adopted in their spirit the values of rationality, bureaucratic co-
ordination, democracy and electoral participation present in the language of the communist 
regime and opposed their distorted practical application. This attitude prepared such groups 
for the role of promoting a capitalist project based on the neo-liberal economic ideology and 
9 Their work built on earlier elite surveys (Szélenyi and Szélenyi 1995; Borocz and Rona-Tas 1995; Fodor, Wnuk-
Lipinski, and Yershova 1995).  
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the ideal of civil society (Eyal, Szélenyi, Townsley 1998, 86-112). And indeed, the fact that 
the agents of change do not own the vast bulk of the national wealth is not inconsistent with 
the current advanced stage of capitalism, where economic power is divided between owners 
and managers (Chandler 1992).  
 
Thus, in CEE, political and managerial classes created conditions for capitalist development 
for largely normative reasons. This analysis confirms Weber’s ideas about the relative 
autonomy of the political sphere, where ideas and identities respond but are not reduced to 
the promotion of material interests. However, the lack of economic power of the new 
political elites in CEE is plain for all to see and it exposes the tension at the core of politics. 
All politicians live ‘off’ politics, as well as living ‘for’ politics. Substantive commitment to 
certain values is the primary motivation for participating in politics, but the rewards for 
political activity also take material economic form (Weber 1994, 320-1). The implications 
for the post-communist politicians of CEE are complex. On the one hand, as Bourdieu 
observed (1991, 183), the autonomy of the political field means that politicians can live off 
politics only because they life for it. For this reason, post-communist politicians cannot 
afford to compromise the integrity and credibility of their position by appearing to serve 
exclusively for material benefit.  
 
However, the fact that relatively poor pro-capitalists are in a position to oversee the vast 
redistribution of state property lends some credence to the hypothesis of ‘political 
capitalism’ (Hankiss 1990; Staniszkis 1991; Brucan 1996; 1998). In these circumstances, it 
is possible that at least some members of the political elites use their positions to enrich 
themselves. At a minimum, the relative dependency on political office for economic survival 
might be expected to create a reluctance to take risks that would endanger that office and 
favour corruption. But, whether this is the case or not, and it has to be remembered that 
politicians everywhere are reluctant to take actions that endanger their office and prospects 
for re-election, the visible economic insecurity of the new political elites can add to their 
problems in establishing credibility.  
 
The power of economic interest groups is also expressed in the political system, in the 
democratic era, in the form of party support along class lines. In contemporary Western 
democracies, this link is considered virtually extinct. Some claim, however, that it might be 
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at work in the post-communist CEE (Szélenyi, Fodor and Hanley 1997; Słomcyńiski and 
Shabad 1997). As it is well known, partial electoral competition in Poland in 1989 revealed 
the lack of popularity of the communist regime there and ushered in a new era. The return to 
power of former communist parties in the second round of free elections, especially in 
Poland in 1993 and Hungary in 1994 was also interpreted as a reassertion of the interests of 
working classes (Szélenyi, Fodor and Hanley 1997). This link was another source for the 
perception that the neo-communist government of the National Salvation Front (FSN) in 
Romania was ‘naturally’ adverse to market reform. While in office, however, the 
reconstructed communists in Poland and Hungary tended to temper rather than halt or 
reverse the neo-liberal policies of their predecessors. At the same time, the FSN initiated a 
gradualist programme of market reform. This would seem to indicate the presence of a 
degree of non-partisan consensus around the values of market and democracy, albeit with 
social-democratic connotations for those on the left. Again, this supports the idea of the 
relative autonomy of politics from the influence of material interests. 
 
As shown above, one area in which the autonomy of politics can be seen at work is the 
commitment of politicians to certain ideas and values. Weber distinguished between the use 
of ideas as ethical ends in themselves and their use as subsumed to an ‘ethic of 
responsibility’ (Weber 1994, 359). Politics can never be morally pure. According to Weber, 
national politics is about using the monopoly of the state on the legitimate use of violence. 
Indeed, violence, in the form of symbolic violence, the privileging of some interests over 
others, and also the potential for open violence, is an intrinsic part of politics.  
 
But, in seeking to deal with the ethical ambiguity of their actions, politicians can be guided 
by an ethic of principled conviction (or absolute principles) or by an ethic of responsibility 
(Weber 1994, 359-63). According to the former, principles are more important than the 
consequences of action derived from them, and the ends justify the means. An ethics of 
responsibility on the other hand is informed by an acceptance of the moral limitations of 
politics and the relativity of its achievements. It limits the use of violence by accepting the 
responsibility for the consequences of political action (Weber 1994, 359-69). 
 
Any ideas and values can be used in any of these two registers, including the liberal ones, 
and underprivileged groups often use an ethic of principled conviction as a source of 
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strength to counterbalance the lack of other resources (Bauman 1995). This choice of ethics 
is an independent political factor in the sense that it cannot be reduced to, although it might 
have some relation to, economic interests. Politics as an independent sphere also means that 
the polity is not bound exclusively by a relative match between the representation of political 
interests as reflected in economic policies and the structure of material or economic interests. 
The integration of the polity is also realised through emotions and symbols.  
 
Edelman argued (1964) that, at a practical level, politics is negotiation among groups who 
own resources and participate directly in the decision-making. But for citizens who have 
little direct bearing on policy-making, and who could not access inside information about it, 
other, more emotional and ritualistic means of integration are at work (Edelman 1964). The 
proceedings of politics – elections, administration, leadership, language, stories and symbols 
– draw in the public by providing ‘objects upon which to displace private emotions, 
especially anxieties and hopes’ (Edelman 1964, 5).  
 
The founding belief of the democratic system, that power is entrusted in the people, who 
chose for its exercise representatives that remain accountable to them, is also socialised 
through symbolic participation. Because this belief is not widely questioned, elections as 
rituals can co-opt the citizenry (Edelman 1964, 3). Thus, even in democracies there is a 
tension between the core, foundational claims on which the polity is founded and the 
empirical truth of relative lack of access to power of the majority of individuals and groups. 
This tension is sustained, but never fully resolved, through the vicarious, ritualistic 
participation in the symbolic universe of the political spectacle.  
 
The end of communism and the dawn of democracy in CEE changed radically the symbolic 
repertoire of politics. The shift from collectivist values to individualism and democracy, 
although prepared and desired by at least some sections of the public, also raised troubling 
questions about the communist past. In the political battles around lustration, the former 
nomenklatura and the restitution of assets nationalised by the communists, economic 
considerations were often less important than achieving some sort of justice and moral 
purification. At the same time, after their experience with communism, the publics of CEE 
were also aware of the dangers and potential mendacity of vicarious participation in a 
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symbolic political universe. This legacy of distrust in the public authorities compounded the 
tasks of political parties and government in gaining the trust of their constituencies.  
 
Group identity claims mediate the participation in the symbolic universe of politics (Fearon 
and Laitin 2000). Individuals and groups generate the meaning of the situations and 
transactions they are involved in, i.e. explain the purpose of their actions, through reference 
to internalised cultural referents that define who they are (Castells 1997, 6-7). Identities give 
predictability to the continuous negotiation of different social contexts, but the adaptive 
solutions that emerge in this interaction with the environment cannot be fully derived from 
the initial identity claims. To an extent, like meaning itself, identities can be retroactive. 
Their contours are revealed, at least partially, by events. 
 
Liberal political scientists introduced a distinction between (liberal) politics based on the 
representation of (economic) interests and identity politics, where solidarity around certain 
cultural norms is predominant (Ost 1993; Offe 1997). The lack of differentiation in the 
inherited socio-economic structure was said to deprive groups of distinct economic interests 
and ethnic distinctions were seen as the foremost sources for political identity building in 
post-communist CEE, leading to a rise in nationalism (Gallagher 1995; Verdery 1996; 
Tismăneanu 1998). It is argued here that this is a distinction of degree rather than kind. In 
any society, groups use ideas and cultural values for self-definition. In fact, interests are 
often closely linked to the promotion of a certain view of the (economic) world. At the same 
time, even for groups that describe themselves primarily according to non-economic criteria, 
economic interests are never entirely absent, if only because the economic survival of any 
group is a prerequisite to the pursuit of any other agenda.   
 
Thus, the economic and political spheres are seen as relatively autonomous. Economic 
activities, as shown by evolutionary economists, are embedded in networks and have a 
degree of resilience. The post-communist systemic transformation in the economy is the 
change in the structuring principle from plan to market (Kornai 2000). At the same time, 
politics also has a degree of autonomy in so far as the source of policies and the strength to 
carry them out are found not only in the backing of economic interests but also in 
institutional thinking, ideas and symbols. Actors tend to operate more in one sphere or 
another, but they also tend to combine elements of both in their identity.   
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Constructivism and critical IPE  
In IPE, critical and constructivist explanations of the international or global economic and 
political relations go beyond the propositions of the neo-liberal and neo-realist theories to 
explain the interplay between the economic and political spheres, domestic and international. 
Both power relations and institutions influence the actions of state and non-state actors. 
Processes of construction of issues, identities and struggles mediate this interplay (Adler 
1997). 10   
 
For Wendt (1995, 135), the structures that organise social actions are created by collective 
meanings. Identities are ‘relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations 
about self’, created in relation, i.e. identification or opposition with such collective meanings 
(Wendt 1995, 135). Actors are constantly confronted with new situations for which they 
have to generate meaning. Through this activity, an accommodation or a match is sought 
between an existing notion of one’s identity, the definition of the situation, and the 
formulation of interests appropriate for the reinforcement or the change of existing identities 
through action (Wendt 1995, 136). Identities and interests can become entrenched in stable 
configurations or structures. While structures do not exist outside of the specific 
socialisation and activity of concrete actors, actors tend to experience structures as external, 
relatively coercive social facts (Wendt 1995, 136-7).  
 
National identities belong to this category of phenomena. They provide individuals with a 
path for identification with their (national) society (Anderson 1991) and result out of a 
process of interpretation of history and creation of ‘collective memory’ (Prizel 1998, 14). In 
spite of the vast potential for inconsistency and selectivity in this activity of interpretation, 
there is a tendency for one section of the polity to become the ‘custodian’ of the collective 
memory of the nation and temporarily close the uncertainty (Prizel 1998, 14).   
 
In this process of national identity building, interaction with the outside world, the discovery 
and valuation of similarities with and differences from other nations and the enactment of 
identity through foreign policy play a crucial role. For the countries of CEE, the opposition 
10 Constructivist readings of security issues can be found in Campbell (1992), Der Derian (1992), Herman (1996), 
and Katzenstein (1996). Political economy examples are Burch (1997), Ruggie (1982; 1992; 1993; 1998), True 
(1997; 1999), and Weber (1990).  
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to and liberation from foreign domination was a core element in their construction of 
national identity. Cultural and political ressentiment, mythologies of common ancestry, and 
the notion of an idealised society that succumbed to pressure from outside are all part of the 
traditional, romantic nationalism of CEE (Tismăneanu 1998). The West was resented and 
admired at the same time. In the post-communist era, the sense of inferiority towards the 
West, the sense of ‘damaged self’ was retained as a major part of the national identity. The 
West was seen as indifferent and cynical, betraying the sacrifice of the Eastern Europeans 
who had been deserted to communism for the sake of securing world peace at the end of 
world-war II (Prizel 1998, 23-9).  
 
Thus, identity building is an example of a social process that can take place in both the 
domestic and international spheres. In both, it is part of the interplay between interests and 
ideas. And indeed, both ideas and interests were used by critical IPE to explain the 
predominance of the neo-liberal economic and political agenda in the last two decades, 
within states and globally  (Biersteker 1992). High levels of inflation and unemployment at 
the end of the 1970s eroded the wealth of the propertied classes in Western Europe and 
undermined the Keynesian faith in demand-led economic growth (Pierson 1995). The ideas 
of neo-liberal economics that had been elaborated over the previous decades became 
attractive at this juncture because they managed to appropriate ideologically experiments 
with privatisation and liberalisation that had emerged as practical solutions to municipal 
budget cuts in the USA (Henig 1990). They also offered a simple recipe for growth, were 
presented in a compelling fashion and resonated well with popular values such as liberty and 
freedom (Campbell 1998).  
 
Subsequently, liberalisation measures first introduced in the USA became adopted 
throughout the world, through mechanisms such as competitive deregulation, political 
difficulties in implementing protectionist measures, and the growing domestic influence of 
neo-liberal advocates and internationally oriented corporate interests (Helleiner 1995). These 
changes in state priorities were concomitant to globalisation (Higgott and Reich 1998; Held 
et al. 1999; Cerny 2000; Higgott 2000). The emphasis on flexible response to competitive 
conditions in specialised markets, as well as the preference for control of inflation 
supplanted an extensive developmental priority (Cerny 2000, 302). The high mobility of 
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technology and capital and the changed conditions for competition eroded the political 
advantages of developing and subsidising a large public sector. 
  
Taking into account new features of global production, business organisation, money and 
finance, the changing role of the state and its relative loss of sovereignty, Scholte (1997) 
defined globalisation as the "spread of 'supraterritorial' or 'transborder' relations." In other 
words, social relations have become less dependent on territorial proximity. This is a 
mutation in the material conditions of existence that raises political questions about 
accountability and democratisation (Scholte 1997). The diminished power of states over 
transnational flows changed to a certain extent the focus around which people can become 
mobilised from national identities to identities based on gender, race, religion, and 
organisational affiliation (Cox 1999; 2000).  
 
The fall of communism in CEE took place against this background of global consensus 
around the neo-liberal norms of economic management. At the same, the shifts in global 
production, trade and finance were keenly felt in the CEE countries as they left behind the 
protective trading agreements of the CMEA and sought to compete in global markets. Thus, 
while establishing that similar social phenomena can be studied with similar tools in the 
domestic and international spheres, reflexive theories also suggest that domestic institutions 
and identity needs of the dominant groups mediate the impacts of global pressures on 
domestic polities and economies.   
  
Reflexive political economy: An assessment  
Reflexive theories, like the neo-liberal and neo-institutionalist theories, meet the initial 
analytical requirement for their synthesis in a political economy approach. In other words, 
they are homologous from the point of view of their units of analysis and explanatory 
strategies. They recognise the dynamic between agency and structure and the processes of 
social construction that mediate their relationships as crucial to understanding economic and 
political phenomena, domestic and international.  
 
A few working hypotheses about the relationships between the economic and political 
spheres can also be derived from these reflexive theories. The economic and political 
spheres are in a relationship of relative autonomy. They each have a relatively autonomous 
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structuring principle, the market and the state power, which is outside the direct influence of 
any one actor. These structuring principles are material and objective in this sense. However, 
the fact that actors subjectively experience them as being objective is a condition of their 
effectiveness.  
 
The links between the two spheres derive from the fact that power accrued within each can 
be used, to a certain extent, for acquiring power in the other. Weber posited that there could 
be tension and misalignment between the dominant groups in economy and politics, but 
there is also a tendency for alignment. It has been argued here that identity is a useful 
concept in bridging the understanding of conversion, tension, alignment and misalignment 
between the economic and political spheres at the macro-level of analysis with an 
understanding of actors and agency. Actors, their assets and their images of themselves are 
influenced by objective structures but are not entirely determined by them. Claims about 
identity bring together economic interests, ideas and symbols.  
 
Thus, at one level, basic economic interests can be expected to impact on the political field 
through voting behaviour or direct participation in policy-making. Additionally, the polity 
rests on principles that hold because there is a level of material co-optation, a prima facie 
coincidence between principles and their institutional embodiment. At the same time politics 
creates a level of inclusion through participation in a particular symbolic universe. This 
multi-layered and complex reality allows economic and political elites as well as the 
dispossessed to act in ways that might be in contradiction with their economic interests.  
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Conclusion  
This paper has investigated three groups of theories, neo-liberal, neo-institutionalist, and 
reflexive, in Economics, Politics and International Political Economy. It has been established 
that within each group, theories display a degree of homology and that thus an initial 
condition for their synthesis in an (international) political economy approach can be 
attempted. However, of these three groups, only reflexive theories take seriously the 
question of how forms of power accrued according to the principles of organisation of one 
sphere can be used to obtain or maintain power in others. On this basis, it is possible to 
generate a few hypotheses about the relative autonomy between the economic and the 
political spheres, the domestic and the international. In addition, it has been shown that in so 
far as these spheres are investigated under their autonomous aspect, neo-institutionalist 
theories can provide useful tools for analysis.    
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